Article 6 Did he merit the opening of the gates for us?

Subquestion 1 It would seem that Christ could not merit for us.

Arguments

1. Just as praise is only for voluntary action, so is merit. Because praise requires free choice in the one receiving it, one person cannot be praised for the act of another. Similarly, one person cannot merit for another. Thus Christ did not merit for us.

2. Ezek. 18:4 says, ""The soul which has sinned shall die." By the same reason, the soul which performs the action will qualify for a reward. Thus it seems that Christ could not merit for us.

On the Contrary

1. As human, Christ is our head. Therefore he has an effect on us and this only in a meritorious way. Therefore Christ merited something for us.

2. No one enters into glory without merit. But baptized children enter into glory. Since they do not enter through their own merits, they enter through the merits for Christ. Thus Christ did merit something for us.

Subquestion 2 It would seem that he did not merit the opening of the gates to us.

Arguments

1. Enoch and Elias entered paradise before the incarnation of Christ. Therefore the gates were already open before Christ.

2. Whoever merits paradise merits the opening of its gates. Because the ancient fathers had charity as full as ours and did everything for the sake of paradise, they merited paradise. Therefore they merited the opening of its gates.

3. An effect follows from sufficient cause without anything additional being required. If therefore Christ had sufficiently merited the opening of the gates of paradise for us, we would not have to do anything further to enter paradise. Since the conclusion is false, so is the premise.

On the Contrary

1. No one entered paradise before Christ. The holy fathers went to limbo. Afterwards, human beings entered paradise, as Lk. 23:43 says, "Today you will be with me in paradise." Therefore Christ merited the opening of the gates to us.

Subquestion 3 It would seem that he did merit the opening of the gates but not through his passion alone.

Arguments

1. Christ's charity was not greater during his passion than before. If therefore he merited through the passion, he merited before as well.

2. In his baptism, "the heavens were opened upon him." From the office of Matins for Epiphany

Close But baptism preceded the passion. Therefore he merited the opening of heaven before the passion.

3. He seemed to accomplish it in the ascension, since Mic. 2:13 says, "He ascended, opening a way before us."

On the Contrary

1. Christ opened the gates by making satisfaction: this however was done through the passion. Therefore he merited the opening of the gates through the passion.

2. The closing of the gates was the decree against us. But "Christ took this decree from our midst and affixed it to the cross." Col. 2:14.

Close Therefore he merited the opening of the gates through the passion.

Solution 1 Response to the First Subquestion

Damascene says in the third book that "the flesh and soul of Christ were like an instrument of the divinity." John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, c. 15, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ser. 2,vol. 9, pp. 63b, 64a

Close Although the divine and human operations of Christ were not identified, the human action had the force of the divinity just as an instrument acts with the power of its principal agent. Damascene says that because of this, "he did human things in a super human way." Thus the meritorious action of Christ, although it was human, had the divine power and could affect the whole of human nature. The action of a person who was only human could not do this because an individual human has less dignity than human nature itself. "The good of the race is greater than human nature itself. The good f the race is grater than the good of an individual human," according to Aristotle. Ethics, bk. 1, 1, 1094, 9-l0.

Close Porphyry observes, "All humans are one human being in the common nature." Isagoge, c. 2, de specie

Close The merit of Christ, however, affected human nature itself and thereby could affect individual humans. Thus he could merit for others.

To the First Objection. Christ's meriting for others can be interpreted in two ways. It could mean that Christ merited as a substitute for someone else who should have merited. Since merit must arise from the will of the one meriting, as the objection asserts, Christ did not merit for others in this way. In another sense, it could mean that he merited something which was beyond the scope of another's power to merit. Christ did merit for others what they could not merit for themselves.

To the Second. Head and members pertain to the same person. Since Christ is our head because of his divinity and the fullness of his grace overflowing into others and since were are him members, his merits are not foreign to us. They come to us through the unity of the mystical body.

To the Third. Christ "did human things in a superhuman way," as has been said.

Solution 2 Response to the Second Subquestion

The closing of the door is an obstacle preventing anyone from entering a house. Similarly, the doors of paradise where closed because there was an impediment which kept anyone from entering. An impediment can be either because of a person, through actual sin, or because of a nature, through original sin. The first does not affect everyone but is proper to sinners. The second, however, is common to all humans. This natural impediment could be removed only by someone whose action could affect the whole nature, namely Christ. Thus he merited the opening of the gates of paradise by removing the impediment which had closed them to the whole ruined nature because of the sin of the first human.

To the First Objection. The earthly paradise is not the same as the heavenly one which consists in the blessed vision of God. The gates to the earthly paradise was closed to human nature. Enoch and Elias entered the earthly paradise before the passion, not the heavenly one which concerns us here.

To the Second. The ancient fathers merited an entrance into paradise in the personal sense, just as we do. But they could not merit the removal of the impediment to human nature. Therefore the gates remained closed to them.

To the Third. The impediment to nature was removed by Christ. Still humans must merit entrance into paradise for their own persons. Therefore a person has to work to merit entrance into paradise.

Solution 3 Response to the Third Subquestion

As has been said, the impediment which closed the gates of paradise was a sin which infected the whole of human nature. Sin is removed by satisfaction. As has also been said, only the passion of Christ could appropriately accomplish this satisfaction. Thus the gates of paradise were opened to us through his passion rather than through the things he had done earlier.

Through his earlier actions, however, he merited his manifestation to us and thereby our conversion to him. This conversion is our progress, not his.

To the First Objection. The merit of satisfaction does not consist in charity alone, but involves the suffering of Christ, as shall be seen below. The gates were opened to us through satisfaction.

To the Second. The heavens were opened in the baptism because through baptism we become shares in the passion of Christ, "we are buried with him in death." Rom. 6:4.

Close Thus baptism opens the gates only because of the passion.

To the Third. The ascension did not open the door to the vision of God which is the essence of paradise. The saints who had been led out of limbo saw God even before the ascension. The ascension opened the gates to a place fit for the blessed.

Distinction 19

Five questions are investigated:

Article 1 Did the passion of Christ liberate us from sin?

Subquestion 1 It would seem that the passion of Christ did not liberate us from sin.

Arguments

1. Christ suffered in his human rather than his divine nature. But only God can give the grace which removes sin. Hence only God can remove sins, according to Is. 43:25. Therefore our sins could not be removed through the passion of Christ.

2. The corporeal cannot act on the spiritual. The passion of Christ was corporeal. Therefore it cannot act on our souls and remove sins.

3. Liberation from sin is the same as justification. This, however, is attributed to the resurrection, since Rom. 4:25 says, "He rose for our justification." Therefore liberation from sin should be attributed to the resurrection, not the passion.

4. The other temporal and spiritual gifts of God inflame us to charity just as the passion of Christ does. Even the examples of the saints excite the love of God in us. Still, we do not say that all these gifts of God free us from sin. Neither, then, should the Master [Lombard] say that Christ's passion liberates us from sin by moving us to charity.

5. We have faith in the passion, but we also believe in the creation of the world. Even though Acts 15:9 says that faith purifies the heart, we do not say that we are cleansed from sins through the good of creation. Neither then should we use this reason to assert that we are freed from sin through the passion.

On the Contrary

1. "He washed us from our sins in his blood," Rev. 1:5

Close which was shed in the passion. Therefore through the passion he freed us from sin.

2. The sign correspond to the thing signified. The ritual of the old law was a sign and figure of Christ. Since according to Heb. 9:22, forgiveness of sins came only through the shedding of blood in the old law, it follows that the remission of sins comes only through the shedding of the blood of Christ.

Subquestion 2 It seems that the death of Christ did not remove all sins.

Arguments

1. Sin is the only cause of condemnation. Many have been damned after the passion of Christ. Therefore it did not remove all guilt.

2. What is abolished once cannot be abolished again. but the sins of the fathers who lived before Christ had been removed already--actual sins through penance and original sin through circumcision. The passion of Christ, therefore, did not remove all the sins of the human race.

3. If sins are abolished before they are committed, they never really happen. Yet many sins ere committed after the passion of Christ. Hence it did not abolish all sins.

4. Penance, baptism and other good works are given to us for the remission of sins. they would not have been given if the passion of Christ had already abolished all sins. Hence it would seem that not all sins were removed.

5. If two things are equal, one cannot overcome the other. But the good Christ did in dying is exactly equal to the evil others did in killing him. God, who is infinitely good, was killed. Thus the death of Christ could not expiate the sin of killing him.

On the Contrary

1. "Within him God made us alive, forgiving all our transgressions." Col. 2:13

Close But to forgive a transgression is to remove an obligation. Therefore through the passion of Christ all sins were removed.

2. The passion of Christ, considered in itself, is equivalent to all the sins which need to be abolished. Hence, if it failed to remove some sins, then it abolished no sins at all. This, however, is absurd.

Solution 1 Response to the First Subquestion

The abolition of sins has two meaning--formal and effective. In the formal sense, grace abolishes sin as white abolishes black, by replacing it. The effective sense of abolition admits three different meanings, varying with the three kinds of efficient cause. In the first way, an efficient cause produces an effect, a principal agent brings about a certain quality or form. God alone abolishes sin in this way because he alone gives grace.

The preparation of a subject to receive a form or quality is a second form of efficiency. In this way, a person who merits the removal of sin is the cause of its abolition. Through his merits, someone is made worthy, prepared like material, to receive the grace through which sins are removed. This preparation can be sufficient or insufficient. Material is sufficiently disposed for a certain effort when that effect necessarily follows upon the preparation. In this way a person is disposed sufficiently through merit when he acquires a right to the effect. This is called condign merit.

No human being can condignly merit either grace or the removal of sin for himself or for another. He cannot merit for himself because, as was said above, he does not have the power to merit before he is in the state of grace. Even the graced, however, cannot merit for others in this way. The action of one person can affect another only to the extent that he is united to him, either in a common nature of by a bond of affection. The first mode of community is essential, the second accidental. The action of one human can affect another through their community of nature only if he can affect human nature itself. Since, however, an individual is less than the nature itself, he cannot affect it and thereby another through it. For this reason an individual cannot merit for another sufficiently or condignly. He can affect him through an accidental union of affection and thus can merit for him insufficiently or congruously.

Because he alone had power to influence the nature itself, both as God and because of his charity and grace which were infinite in a way, only Christ can merit sufficiently for others. Above, d. 13, q. a, a. 2, sol. 2

Close He merited for the whole nature by fulfilling the obligation of human nature, the debt of death owed for sin. Since Christ was free of all sin he himself was not bound to die. Hence he discharged the debt of human nature. Therefore, by making satisfaction for the whole nature, he merited sufficiently for the abolition of the sins of others who did have them.

An instrumental agent is the third type of efficient cause. The sacraments remove sins in this way, as instruments of the saving divine mercy.

To the First Objection. Because his action had the associated power of the divinity, as has already been said, Christ performed human actions in a superhuman way. Although his passion was a human operation, he abolished sins by it in the same way that he cleansed a leper by bodily touching.

To the Second. Although the passion was in the body, the spirit had to accept it. Thus he merited the cleansing of our spirits through his passion.

To the Third. Because Christ is of the same nature as we are, his action is somewhat univocal, that is, it bears a similarity to its effect. Now justification and the forgiveness of sins designate a single action in different ways. According to its result, the change from guilt to grace is called justification: from its starting point it is called the abolition of sins. Hence the abolition of sins is attributed to the death which deprived Christ of a life of suffering, a life like the penal life of sinners. Justification, however, is attributed to the resurrection through which a new life began in Christ. The Apostle says this: "He rose for our justification and was handed over for our trespasses." Rom. 4:25.

Close

To the Fourth. Christ is called our head because he influenced us by his merit, as was explained in distinction 13 above. No matter how sufficient the head is in itself, however, it affects only those members which are joined to it, not those separated from it. Although the merit of Christ is sufficient to abolish sins, the things which join the members to the head, faith and charity, are also necessary for their effective removal. For this reason the Master speaks of faith and charity as though they were causes of the efficacy of the removal of guilt. He expresses the cause of the sufficiency for its removal, however, in saying that the death of Christ is the true sacrifice through which sins are forgiven. Although charity is inflamed by the other divine gifts and the examples of the saints, as excited by these it does not join a person to a merit which is sufficient to remit sins. Rather charity joins to such merit only when excited by the passion of Christ.

A similar response can be made tot he fifth objection about faith.

Solution 2 Response to the Second Subquestion

For one being to produce an effect in another two things are necessary: the agent must have sufficient power for the particular effect, and the subject must be disposed to receive the action of the agent.

Christ's power is sufficient to remove all our sins on two counts. Consider first the action itself, in which meriting consists. Since Christ's operation belongs to both God and man, therefore, has an infinite efficacy. Consider then what the passion took away, a soul united to God. Its union with God gave the soul of Christ an infinite value. Thus he had an infinite efficacy in making satisfaction.

On our part, however, it is necessary that we prepare ourselves to receive the effects of the merits of Christ through faith in our minds, love in our hearts, and imitation in our actions. This does not happen in everyone.

All sins were abolished through the passion of Christ, therefore, with regard to the sufficiency of the satisfaction and merit, but not with regard to its efficacy.

To the First Objection. The damned have an indisposition to receive the effect of the merit of Christ. This indisposition rather than the insufficiency of the merits of the passion of Christ prevents their sins being forgiven.

To the Second. The passion of Christ had its effects even in the saints who lived before the incarnation. They had faith in his passion and were thereby justified. However, the passion itself had not yet been actually accomplished in the order to events: it existed only in their faith insofar as they believed in Christ by personal action. Thus the justification they received through their faith removed only the personal impediment, not cleansed from sin, but because the impediment to nature had not yet been removed, they did not enter the gate of paradise.

To the Third. The sufficiency of the passion of Christ can remove sins even before they are committed. But its efficacy comes only after a person turns from the sin he has committed. In the same way, a drug capable of curing can be developed before a person is sick, but does not actually cure him until he is sick.

To the Fourth. Baptism, penance and the other sacraments are necessary for abolishing sins as instrumental agents in removing guilt. They draw upon the power of the passion of the Lord and apply this power to us.

To the Fifth. Although the one killed was God, the killers did not know he was God, for "if they had know, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory." I Cor. 2:8

Close This ignorance lessened, but did not totally excuse, their sin. Their sin and the merit of Christ were equivalent in a way, by having the same object. Christ lovingly gave that corporeal life which they hatefully destroyed. The two actions wee not equivalent in their motive. The charity of Christ in laying down his life greatly exceed the iniquity of those who hatefully took it away. Moreover, good is more powerful than evil, which acts only through the power of good, as Dionysius says in chapter four of On the Divine Names. nn. 31,32.

Close

Article 2 It seems that the passion of Christ did not liberate us from the devil.

Arguments

1. Liberty consists in immunity from coercion. But the devil could no more coerce free choice before the passion of Christ than he can now. Therefore the passion of Christ did not liberate us from the power the devil.

2. The devil had only that power over the possessions and flesh of Job which he was given by God. But even now if God gives him the power he can afflict humans in their possessions and persons. Therefore we are no more free of his power now than we were before.

3. Before the passion of Christ the demon could humans only by tempting their souls and molesting their bodies. Yet he does this even today. Therefore his power is not diminished.

4. The one really held in servitude to the devil is the devotee who worships him. Since many idolaters can be found even today, the human race is not liberated from servitude to the devil.

5. The Apostle says that "in the last days there will come times of persecution and men will be lovers of self, etc." 2 Tim. 3:1,2

Close At the time of Antichrist this will be more prevalent than ever before. Therefore the passion of christ did not destroy the power of the devil.

On the Contrary

1. The Lord said at the beginning of the passion, "The prince of this world is cast out." Jn. 12:31.

Close Therefore through the passion of Christ the devil was deprived of his dominion.

2. The role of conqueror is to expel his adversary from the position of ruling. But Christ was victor through his passion. "Behold the lion of the tribe of Judah is victorious." Rev. 5:5

Close Therefore he deprived the demons of power.

3. The devil dominated humans through sin. Through his passion Christ freed humans from sin and thus from the power of the demon.

Response

The power of the demon consists in attacking and in holding the defeated captive. A person becomes his servant not simply by being attacked but by being defeated, as 2 Pet. 2:19 makes clear. The devil conquered the whole human race in its first parents. He then ruled over them and accomplished his purpose by drawing them down so that no one entered the gates of paradise. He conquered each person individually by turning him to sin, since "whoever sins is a servant of sin." Jn. 8:34

Close

The power by which the devil held the defeated captive was totally removed by Christ through his passion, at least with regard to sufficiency. In efficacy the power is removed only in those who partake of the strength of the passion through faith, charity and the sacraments. In this, then, Christ destroyed the dominion of the devil.

The devil's power of attacking was diminished rather than totally removed. Christ himself overcame the enemy and then gave humans many helps for resisting him, such as the sacraments, more abundant grace and other such things.

To the First Objection. Although the devil tempts now as he did before, he does not overcome as easily because humans have more assistance.

To the Fourth. Idolaters are still under servitude to the devil because they despise the helps which come from the passion of Christ.

To the Fifth. The multitude of evildoers will not arise in the last times because of any deficiency in the power of the passion of Christ. Rather the charity of many will grow cold Mt. 24:12

Close and they will reject and despise the weapons God gives them through the passion of Christ. It is no wonder if they are overcome.

Article 3 Did he liberate us from punishment?

Subquestion 1 It would seem that the passion of Christ did not liberate us from eternal punishment.

Arguments

1. Eternal punishment is the punishment of hell. But "in hell there is no redemption." From the Monastic Office for the Dead

Close Therefore the passion of Christ did not free from eternal punishment.

2. If Christ had not suffered, only those who sin mortally would have gone to hell. But even now that he has suffered, only those who sin mortally go to hell. Therefore the passion of Christ did not free us from eternal punishment.

On the Contrary

1. Sin is the cause of eternal death. Christ liberated from sin. Therefore, from eternal death as well.

2. "You lead out captives by the blood of the covenant . . . ." Zech. 9:11.

Close

Subquestion 2 It would seem that he did not liberate us from temporal punishment.

Arguments

1. Even now temporal punishment is imposed for sin. Therefore we were not liberated by Christ.

2. "Christ suffered for us, leaving us an example so that we might follow in his way." 1 Pet. 2:21

Close But this is through suffering. Therefore through his passion, Christ bound us to suffer temporal punishment rather than liberating us from it.

3. Through the resurrection of the dead we will be freed from all temporal punishment. But even if Christ had not suffered, the dead would rise, since the resurrection of the dead is an article of faith. Therefore the passion of Christ did not free us from temporal punishment.

4. To grant a sufficient cause is to grant its effect. But temporal punishment remains even in those who partake in every way of the strength of the passion of Christ. Therefore the passion of Christ did not liberate from temporal punishment.

On the Contrary

1. Temporal punishment is remitted through the keys of the church. The keys of the church have their power from the passion of Christ. Therefore the passion of Christ took away temporal punishment.

2. God does not punish the same thing twice. Nah. 1:12

Close But God loaded on Christ the iniquities of us all, since "he carried our sorrows." Is. 53:4

Close Therefore he freed us from temporal punishment through his passion.

Solution 1 Response to the First Subquestion

Eternal punishment is contrasted to eternal life and is so called because it is the privation of eternal life. Humans can lose eternal life in two ways: through the sin of nature, original sin, whose punishment is the loss of the divine vision, and through personal actual sin, mortal sin.

All incur the eternal punishment which follows upon original sin. Some, like those still alive, incur it only as a sentence or obligation. Others, like those already dead, incur the eternal punishment owing to actual sin. Not everyone has incurred this punishment. Some, such as those in mortal sin but still alive, incur it only as a sentence. Others, such as the damned, have the experience itself.

The passion of Christ brought a dual liberation from the eternal punishment due for the original sin which all contract. He removed the obligation from those who efficaciously participate in his redemption while they are still alive. He removed the punishment itself from those who were already dead: sufficiently for all, efficaciously from those who had no impediment.

He absolved from the punishment due for mortal sin in two ways. He provided helps so that no one need incur this obligation. He also provided a remedy by which the sentence could be removed from those who take the strength of his passion into themselves. No one, however, can be liberated from this punishment once he has begun to suffer it. Because he is not longer in the state of pilgrimage, he cannot receive grace and charity through which the strength of Christ's passion is poured into human beings.

To the First Objection. Eternal punishment does not designate only the sufferings of the damned in hell from which there is no redemption. The damned have neither grace nor a capacity for it by which the passion of Christ could affect them. Eternal punishment also designates the suffering of limbo where the holy fathers were. Because of the grace and charity which were in these saints, the passion of Christ could reach them. They were redeemed from this eternal punishment.

To the Second. Although those who sin mortally after the passion of Christ go to hell, the passion of Christ could have preserved them from sin and even healed the wound of sin in them. Considered in itself, the passion does free from eternal punishment.

To the Third. The punishment of hell is eternal for two reasons: the one being punished has neither the power to free himself nor the disposition through which the power of another liberator could affect him. This punishment, then, cannot be terminated. The punishment of limbo is eternal only because the one suffering does not have the power to free himself. Although he has the disposition to receive liberation, if there was no liberation the punishment would be eternal. The person being punished has the strength of grace within himself. The punishment expiates and ends when the purgation is completed.

Solution 2 Response to the Second Subquestion

A temporal punishment is one which deprives a person of a temporal good, the kind of thing which does not last forever. Humans endure two forms of temporal punishment.

Some are universal in human nature, like the necessity of dying, susceptibility to suffering, and disobedience of the flesh to the spirit, and such things. Human nature incurs these punishments because of original sin: they are the kind of thing which follows from human nature itself once the grace of innocence is lost. The suffering of Christ's passion was sufficient to remove these punishments from all humans, although they are not effectively removed from those who do not share in his passion. Nor even removed as soon as a person receives the sacrament of the passion. Because these punishments are owed by nature itself, in which all are one, they will be taken away from all the saints at one time, the end of the world. At that time not only individuals but the nature of the whole world will be restored through the resurrection: "the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to corruption and obtain the glorious liberty of the children of God." Rom. 8:21

Close

Other punishments are inflicted on particular individuals, and these for two reasons. They are inflicted to set free from guilt, since guilt brings the obligation to punishments. As regards sufficiency, the death of Christ removed all such punishments by removing their cause. But to be effectively liberated from these punishments, a person must participate in the passion of Christ. This can be done in two ways. Through the sacrament of the passion, baptism, we are buried with Christ in death. Rom. 6:4

Close Because the divine power which works salvation in baptism cannot fail in any way, all temporal punishment is removed. A person also participates in the passion by real conformity to it, by suffering with the suffering Christ. This happens in penance. This conformity, which is the consequence of our own action, can be perfect or imperfect. When the conformity is perfect, proportional to the obligation of the guilt involved, the punishment is completely removed. This conformity can be in contrition alone or in the other elements of penance as well. When, however, the conformity is imperfect, some penal obligation remains to be satisfied either in this world or in purgatory. Because the passion of the head overflows into his members to the extent that they are united to him in charity, the conformity to the passion of Christ need not be proportional to the kind of punishment which would be necessary to satisfy one's obligation of guilt. The force of the passion of Christ diminishes the punishment to be exacted and to that extent it takes away the punishment.

Secondly, punishment is imposed on individuals for medicinal purposes, since punishments are medicines of a kind, as is said in the second book of the Ethics. Aristotle, Ethics, bk. 2, 2, 1104, 7

Close They are for the cure of the person, either to preserve him from sin or to move him to virtue. They are also for the sake of others, to provide an example for them, so that one person makes satisfaction for others in some way. The passion of Christ neither totally abolishes nor even diminishes this kind of punishment during the present life. Because we can still sin and because the punishment can profit both us and others, the increase of charity brings an increase in temporal punishment. In the future, at the end of this pilgrimage, the power of the passion of Christ will take away all punishment.

To the First Objection. Temporal punishment is imposed for two reasons. As making satisfaction it conforms a person to the passion of Christ through imitation. Thus where a person is conformed to the passion through the sacrament of baptism, no punishment is imposed for making satisfaction. Punishment is also imposed as a medicine, to preserve and promote, not as something required.

To the Second. The same solution applies.

To the Third. The effecting of justification is attributed to the resurrection because of the final effect, but to the passion because of the starting point. Similarly, the effecting of glorification is attributed to the resurrection because of the glory given, but to the passion because of the punishment removed.

To the Fourth. In causes which operate under the ordering of wisdom, it is not necessary that the effect follow immediately from the cause. The effect follows at the time that the order of wisdom requires. This is the way the passion of Christ works.

Notes

Distinction 18, Article 6

1. From the office of Matins for Epiphany. 2. Col. 2:14. 3. John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, c. 15, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ser. 2, vol. 9, pp. 63b, 64a. 4. Ethics, bk. 1, 1, 1094, 9-l0. 5. Isagoge, c. 2, de specie. 6. Rom. 6:4.

Distinction 19 1. Rev. 1:5. 2. Col. 2:13. 3. Above, d. 13, q. a, a. 2, sol. 2. 4. Rom. 4:25. 5. I Cor. 2:8. 6. nn. 31,32. 7. 2 Tin. 3:1,2. 8. Jn. 12:31. 9. Rev. 5:5. l0. Jn. 8:34 11. Mt. 24:12 12. From the Office of the Dead. 13. Zech. 9:11. 14. 1 Pet. 2:21 15. Nah. 1:12 16. Is. 53:4 17. Rom. 8:21 18. Rom. 6:4. 19. Aristotle, Ethics, bk. 2, 2, 1104, 7.